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My title, "Police Arrest Privileges in a Free
Society," is merely one summation of the dilemma
presented by the fact that you cannot have com-
plete, absolute freedom in a free society when
some people are confined or their freedom of
movement and conduct is restricted. Doctor
Samuel Johnson, some two hundred years ago,
stated the dilemma and emphasized its apparent
insolubility when he said: "The danger of un-
bounded liberty and the danger of bounding it
have produced a problem in the science of govern-
ment which human understanding seems hitherto
unable to solve." The subjects under discussion
in this International Conference seem to indicate
that Johnson was being unduly optimistic when
he modified his statement by the insertion of the
word, "hitherto."
It is my intention, in discussing police arrest
privileges, to consider both the danger of un-
bounded liberty and the danger of bounding it, in
the belief that a fair compromise is possible
between the two-a compromise that will be to
the advantage of a free society. The discussion will
be within the framework of our Constitution; its
amendment or violation is not proposed. This
exclusion of the constitutional guarantees from
the discussion cannot be absolute, however, for
the reason that the reasonableness of search and
seizure is often dependent upon the validity of the
arrest.
Our free society has created a system designed
to identify and apprehend the person who commits
a crime and to give him a fair trial in which the
truth of his guilt or innocence is to be established.
This syste/n is based on the principle that guilty
persons should be adjudged guilty. The trial
court is as ethically bound to ascertain the guilt of
the guilty as it is to ascertain the innocence of
the innocent. Rules that exclude material and
relevant facts bearing on the guilt or innocence of
the defendant are inconsistent with this principle
and with the oath to tell the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth. Since an invalid
arrest may result in the exclusion of material and
relevant facts, the liberalization of arrest privileges
would lessen the likelihood of the exclusion of
truth, and would also facilitate the apprehension
of criminals and lessen the physical hazards of the
police.
The rules that establish the validity of arrest,
as well as the other police arrest privileges under
discussion, should be established by legislation, as
was proposed in 1942 by the Interstate Crime
Commission in its Uniform Arrest Act. The courts
may then rule on their constitutionality. The
decisions would probably be favorable; the provi-
sions of the Uniform Act have not been declared
unconstitutional in any of the states that have
adopted them.
THE PROBrEM
Both unbounded liberty and its restriction place
basic human rights in jeopardy. Unbounded liberty
jeopardizes the security of life and property and,
indeed, the security of our free society. Were this
not so, there would be no need to place any
restrictions on liberty. Restricting liberty, on the
other hand, jeopardizes the basic human right to
freedom in movement and conduct.
The problem, then, is to prescribe restrictions
which will provide an acceptable degree of secu-
rity without unduly infringing upon individual
freedom. The restrictions on liberty now under
discussion are adjusted by increasing or decreasing
police arrest privileges. They must be so regulated
that the price paid in inconvenience and restraint
has an equal compensating value in the advantages
of greater security. to keep the scales of justice
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in balance, the advantages to a free society result-
ing from a reasonable degree of security in one
pan must hold in precise equilibrium the other
containing the disadvantages that result from
restrictions.
This means compromise; some liberty must be
sacrificed for the sake of security. A compromise is
a modification of opposing views so that they may
blend to the mutual satisfaction of the opponents.
The opponents in the issue under discussion are not
the assailant and his victim but instead law
abiding citizens who differ in their appraisals of the
danger of unbounded liberty on the one hand and
the danger of bounding it on the other. The issue
is not simplified by the fact that both groups would
like to have at the same time both complete
security and complete liberty. The impossibility
of achieving both desires simultaneously is recog-
nized, and each group makes a compromise it
believes will provide a suitable balance between
maximum security and minimum restriction on
liberty. Were the appraisals by the groups identi-
cal, the problem would be solved. Since opposing
groups make different appraisals, a reconciliation
of the opposing views must be sought.
Wno SH oLD AxRRATE?
Compromise is a characteristic of a free society,
the strength of which is derived from consolidating
the most acceptable features of opposing views
into a workable system. In compromise, each side
appraises what it gains in advantage against what
it loses in disadvantage; there is then a measure
of give and take. The appraisal in a free society is
participated in by the citizens with the legislature
serving as the arbitrator to say, "This is the way
it will be." This democratic process enables
citizens to have their desires implemented by law.
In the absence of legislation bearing on some
aspect of police arrest privileges, the appellate
courts may make decisions that are as binding in
their effect as legislative enactments. The process
which results in an appellate decision is markedly
different from the legislative process. The issue
before the court relates to the rights of the appel-
lant, who has been judged guilty by the most
liberal system of criminal justice found anywhere -
in the world. The court considers whether the
rights of the appellant have been violated, not by
organized society, but by a policeman whose
actions are often viewed with distaste because all
of the facts which may have justified the action
are not on the record. The court ponders the alleged
infringement of the rights of the convicted person
as a legal abstraction and feels obliged to consider
the question as it would apply were the individual
innocent. Finally, the desires of the general public
for some reasonable measure of security and for
a redress of the wrong done to the innocent victim
of the criminal are not made known nor are they
readily available to the court.
The issue before us does not jeopardize the
integrity of the Constitution. Instead, it involves
an appraisal of relative dangers, of advantages
arrayed against disadvantages, which result from
restrictions on liberty imposed by police arrest
privileges. Statesmen representative of the people
seem better qualified to make fair appraisals of
public needs than appellate judges who, by virtue
of their positions, are not so responsive to the
desires of the public. The fundamental question is
not a legal one after its constitutionality has been
established. Instead, it is a philosophical problem
in the science of government.
APPRAISAL OF THREATS To SECURITY
It is apparent that equilibrium in the scales of
justice may necessitate adjustment of the weight
in one pan to compensate for a change in weight
in the other. Should reasonable security be jeopar-
dized by an increase in criminality, further restric-
tions on liberty may be justified. On the other
hand, a society that has minimum criminality may
enjoy maximum liberty.
An accurate and valid comparison of the crime
frequency of this country with that of other
countries is not possible today, but analysis and
fair interpretation of available statistics lead to
the conclusion that our country is among those
having the highest crime rates. This fact in itself
is apparently not alarming to a people accustomed
to excel in industrial production, in standard of
living-and in liberty.
Some cause for concern is found, however, in
that the extent of criminality in our country is not
remaining constant at this excessively high level.
Instead, it is increasing at an alarming rate year
by year. For example, the frequency of those
crimes categorized by the F.B.I. as "Part I
crimes" increased four times more rapidly than the
population of this country during the first seven
years of this decade.
In 1958, the F.B.I. adopted a new crime index
which differed from the previously used Part I
crimes by the exclusion of negligent manslaughter,
statutory rape, and larceny under $50. This new
(Vol. 51
POLICE DETENTION AND ARREST PRIVILEGES
and more accurate index revealed that crime
increased five times more rapidly than population
from 1957 to 1958.
Reports for the first nine months of 1959 from
cities with a total population of 69 million showed
an overall decrease of 1% in the number of crimes
from the comparable 1958 statistics. It seems un-
wise to conclude from these incomplete figures,
however, that the upward crime trend has been
halted.
During the past decade, the police of this
country have been strengthened in number, in
training, and in 'equipment. They are better
organized and are using more progressive proce-
dures to prevent crime and to apprehend criminals
than ever before in their history. Crime increases
during the past decade have not resulted from a
decrease in police effectiveness; they must be
accounted for by other factors.
The effectiveness of a free society in controlling
criminals may be measured in part by its success
in convicting defendants. Comparison of 1957 and
1958 conviction rates with the average for the
previous five-year periods in offenses included in
the new crime index (excluding forcible rape, for
which statistics are not available prior to 1958)
and in four other classes of crimes (stolen property
offenses, weapons offenses, narcotic law violations,
and gambling) reveal a startling trend, as is
shown in the table reproduced here.
In each of these crime categories (except homi-
cides and narcotic offenses in 1957), the 1957 and
1958 conviction rates are lower than the average
for the preceding five years. In 1957 the conviction
rate for robbery, compared to the previous five-
year average, decreased 19%; for aggravated
assault, 18%; for burglary, 11%; for stolen prop-
erty offenses, 12%; for weapons offenses, 16 c; for
gambling, 30%. In 1958, the conviction rate for
robbery, compared to the previous five-year
average, decreased 18%; for aggravated assault,
14%; for burglary, 7%; for stolen property offenses,
14%; for gambling, 29%; for homicide, 4%; for
narcotic offenses, 6%.
Decreases of such magnitude in conviction rates
may be taken, with the persistent increase in crime,
as a warning that the scales of justice are getting
out of balance. Where lies the fault? There is no
indication that police procedures used in marshal-
ing evidence against the defendant are becoming
less effective; indeed, the reverse seems more
likely. Nor does it seem that prosecutors have
grown less vigorous or that defense attorneys
have suddenly discovered new and more successful
techniques. May the explanation be found in the
restrictions that have been imposed on the police
by appellate decisions?
THE PLIGHT OF THE POLICE
People on the whole want protection from crimi-
nal attack; they want to feel secure in their homes
and on the streets from disturbances and molesta-
tions. To meet this need, local communities in our
free society have created uniformed bodies of
PROPORTION OF PERSONS CHARGED WHO WEV CiONVICTED, 1957 AND 1958
COmPARED wiTH PREVIous 5-YEAR AvERAGEs
Percentage of Convictions
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police to prevent crimes and to bring to court
those who commit them. Responsibility for the
prevention of crime rests principally on city
police forces, sheriffs' departments, and local
detachments of state police.
A crime occurs when a person who desires to
commit it discovers the opportunity to do so.
Such unwholesome desires spring from and are a
measure of criminality. The police cannot prevent
the development of criminality, except as their
contacts with potential and actual offenders may
have this wholesome effect; nor are the police
charged with this responsibility. Their basic
purpose is to remove or lessen by both physical
and psychological means the opportunity to
commit crimes.
To prevent crime, the police must either stand
guard at every point of possible attack, which is a
physical and economic impossibility, or intercept
the person with criminal intent before he robs,
rapes, or kills. It is better to have an alert police
force that prevents the crime than one that devotes
its time to seeking to identify the assailant after
the life has been taken, the daughter ravished, or
the pedestrian slugged and robbed.
The task of the police in preventing crime is
quite different from that of identifying the perpe-
trator and marshaling evidence to prove his guilt.
To prevent crime by intercepting the criminal
while he seeks his prey is not unlike hunting a
predatory animal; prompt and decisive action is
called for at a critical moment not of the hunts-
man's choosing. The policeman who fails to act at
the critical moment may nonetheless prevent an
impending crime, but the criminal, who more times
than not is wanted for previous unsolved crimes,
remains at large to continue his depredations.
Restrictions on arrest privileges hamper the police
not only in preventing crime but also in clearing
cases by the arrest of the perpetrator and in
marshaling evidence to support prosecution.
The local police feel the restrictions imposed on
arrest privileges more keenly than do the special-
ized police agencies whose principal responsibility
is the gathering of evidence to identify and convict
persons after they have committed a crime, rather
than to prevent the act in the first instance.
Frequently the criminal, whose act is within the
jurisdiction of a specialized police agency, has
already been arrested by local police who often
apprehend him in the act or in flight from the
crime scene. These are critical moments for police
action. In cases where the culprit has not been
arrested, the critical moment for arrest can often
be set by the specialized police; it is planned after
sufficient evidence is marshaled to justify the
arrest which is often authorized by warrant. In
contrast, most arrests by local police are made
without warrant at a critical moment not of their
choosing before they have had an opportunity to
marshal evidence beyond what they personally
observed at the time.
The typical citizen would feel that the police
were remiss in their duty should they fail on their
own initiative, or refuse on legal grounds, to
investigate by questioning a person who was
lurking in the neighborhood for no apparent reason.
The disturbed citizen would expect the police to
discover whether the suspect was armed and, if so,
to disarm him and prosecute him should it be
discovered that he was carrying the weapon
illegally. Should the suspect refuse to explain
what he was doing in the neighborhood, and the
policeman apologized for questioning him and
then went about his duties leaving the suspect to
continue his lurking, the citizen would consider
that he was not receiving adequate protection.
The typical citizen is surprised when he dis-
covers that in many jurisdictions police arrest
privileges are so carefully circumscribed by
statutory and case law as to render the policeman
virtually powerless to deal effectively and safely
with situations that confront him almost hourly
during his duty tour. The police action demanded
by the citizen from his protector is illegal in many
jurisdictions.
The police, under local control as in our form of
government, are inclined to provide the protection
their citizen-employers demand; otherwise the
police fail to prevent crime and are subject to
sharp criticism for their failure to protect the
public. Also, since they usually act with courtesy,
discretion, and good judgment, only infrequently
is the legality of their acts questioned, and then
by a citizen who fails to understand and appreciate
the police motive or by a lawyer who uses the
incident in the defense of his guilty client.
The discrepancy between what the people expect
the police to do and what the police are privileged
to do in protecting public peace and security results
principally from a lack of understanding of the
police purpose and of what the police must do to
accomplish it.
The police must accept some blame for lack of
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public confidence in the means they use to achieve
their purpose. Police abuse of their authority must
be eliminated, not by withdrawing essential author-
ity or by freeing the guilty criminal, but by raising
police standards to a level of trustworthiness and
by some action which will penalize the community
that employs an officer who abuses his privileges.
Police leadership has been dilatory in raising
service qualifications and ethical standards. How-
ever, the police now have an acceptable code of
ethics and their qualification standards are being
raised from coast to coast. Each local community
should insist on improvement in the quality of its
police service until all have achieved professional
status. The community that is penalized for abuse
of arrest privileges will be likely to demand both
higher standards and disciplinary action against
the offending officer.
Lack of public understanding of the police
purpose and what the police must do to accom-
plish it is accentuated by two circumstances that
tend to cast the police in the role of agents bent on
unnecessarily oppressing freedom. The first grows
out of police responsibility in the enforcement of
traffic and other regulatory laws sometimes vio-
lated by the most conscientious citizen, an enforce-
ment that aligns good citizens against the police.
The other is ignorance of the facts involved in the
war against crime in a free society. People are
apt to fear and hate what they do not understand-
and the hate is often stimulated by traffic violation
experiences.
These misunderstandings continue unabated
because the police are not a vocal, scholarly group
that devotes much time to presenting in a favorable
light the facts that bear on the problem. The
literature in consequence is principally devoted to
the case against the police; little has been written
in their defense. The press, the literature, and
even case law are all directed at incidents that
discredit the police. Small wonder that those who
read the papers or research the literature and
case law conclude that the police are evil. Informa-
tion on which a fairer judgment might be based
is not generally circulated.
Highly intelligent people ponder the police role
as a hypothetical abstraction, in ignorance of the
true facts, and conceive the police to be a potential
instrument of tyranny which will destroy the
essential freedom of a free society. Since their
reading and research are restricted to incidents
that discredit the police, they conclude that all
police are bad. These citizens, as protectors of
liberty and freedom, then align themselves against
the police without giving attention to the cost of
criminal depredations.
There have been exceptions in which men whose
integrity and judgment are respected have accom-
panied the police on their tours of duty in order to
learn and report the true facts. Professors John
Barker Waite of the University of Michigan Law
School and Sam Bass Warner of the Harvard Law
School are two examples. Their "experiences gave
them a sympathetic understanding of the problems
confronted by the police in consequence of anti-
quated rules governing the questioning and de-
taining of suspects, searching them for weapons
when police safety is jeopardized, arresting them
when conditions warrant such action, and the
right of the suspect under some conditions forcibly
to resist arrest by a uniformed policeman. These
men have championed in books and articles the
liberalization of arrest privileges because through
their experiences they have gained a sound under-
standing of the handicaps of the modem policeman
in his legal war against crime. On the basis of his
police experiences, Professor Warner played the
principal role in drafting the Uniform Arrest Act.
ESSENTIAL POLICE ARREST PRIVILEGES
Law enforcement may be strengthened by
legalizing common police practices, already legal in
some jurisdictions, which would have the effect of
facilitating the discovery of criminals and evidence
of their guilt and of lessening the exclusion of
relevant evidence from their trials. The police
should be authorized to question persons whose
actions under the circumstances then existing
are such as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the
suspect may be seeking an opportunity to commit
a crime. A police officer should be privileged to
search such a suspect for weapons when the officer
has reasonable grounds to believe that he is in
danger if the person possesses a dangerous weapon,
and, should the suspect be illegally armed, to
arrest him for this offense. Should the suspect be
unable or unwilling to explain satisfactorily the
reasons for his presence and actions, the officer
should be authorized to take him to a police station
and hold him while the investigation is continued,
for a period of two hours, without placing him
under arrest.
The police should be privileged to release an
arrested person without bringing him before a
19601
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magistrate when their investigation reveals his
innocence or when a drunk has become sober. The
police should be authorized to hold an arrested
person before bringing him before a magistrate for
at least 24 hours, excluding days when courts are
not in session. Magistrates should be authorized
to order the defendant to be held for an additional
period when good cause for such detention is
shown.
A police officer should be authorized to arrest
under a warrant when the warrant is not in his
possession, to arrest without a warrant for any
misdemeanor committed in his presence, and to
arrest without a warrant for petty thefts and other
misdemeanors not committed in his presence when
he has reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant could not be found after the warrant
was issued.
Suspects should be denied the right to resist
illegal arrest by a person the suspect has reasonable
grounds to believe to be a police officer. The
police should be authorized and urged to use notices
to appear in court in lieu of physical arrest in
suitable misdemeanor cases when they believe
the defendant will appear as agreed. Persons the
police have reasonable grounds to believe to be
witnesses to crimes should be legally required to
identify themselves to the police.
These are essentially the provisions of the Uni-
form Arrest Act. To them should be added author-
ity for the police to search any convicted narcotic
offender for contraband, without a warrant, when
his actions, under the circumstances then existing,
are such as to arouse reasonable suspicion that
the suspect may have contraband in his possession.
The reasonable arrest privileges mentioned
above would facilitate the achievement of objec-
tives in law enforcement desired by all persons
except the criminals themselves. The privileges
would enable the police to exercise such control
over persons in public places as to enhance the
peace and security of all citizens.
These privileges do not threaten the lives or
health of the innocent; the inconvenience of two
hours of detention short of arrest is experienced
only by the innocent person who inadvertently or
by poor judgment is found in a situation that
arouses police suspicion and which the suspect is
unable or unwilling to explain on the spot. In view
of the present jeopardy to public security, such
inconvenience seems a small price to pay for the
privilege of living securely and peacefully.
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST POLICE ABUSE
OF AUTHORITY
Police abuse of authority with criminal intent
resulting in serious offenses must always be dealt
with by criminal prosecution and disciplinary
action. Establishing safeguards against abuse of
authority by the overzealous policeman in the
day-to-day performance of his duty presents quite
a different problem. Safequards that weaken law
enforcement or free the guilty are socially unde-
sirable; if possible the problem should be solved
in some other way.
Civil suits for damages filed against the individ-
ual officer have not proved adequately effective in
preventing police abuse of authority. Were this
procedure effective, however, it would emasculate
vigorous police action and law enforcement would
be weakened at a time when it needs to be strength-
ened.
Negating police overzealousness by freeing
guilty defendants violates the principle that the
guilty should be adjudged guilty, punishes society
rather than the policeman, rewards the guilty, and
is a miscarriage of justice. Its effectiveness as a
control of police abuse of authority has not been
demonstrated.
The Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure
of the California State Bar proposed that
" ... the answer might lie in a new kind of civil
action, 6r better, a summary type of proceeding,
for a substantial money judgment in favor of the
wronged individual, whether innocent or guilty,
and against the political subdivision whose
enforcement officers violated that person's
rights. After not many outlays of public funds
the taxpayers and administrative heads would
insist upon curbing unlawful ijolice action.'
Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr., of the Uni-
versity of California Law School, in commenting
on this proposal, stated:
"Legislative action along these general lines gives
promise of providing a more adequate solution
than the exclusionary rule at a smaller social
cost.... The remedy would be available to the
innocent as well as the guilty, for the illegal
arrest as well as the illegal search. The courts
would have frequent opportunities for ruling on
the legality of police action, for enunciating and
developing the governing law. If in any com-
munity a substantial number of such actions
129 CAL. ST. BAR JOUR. 263-64 (1954).
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become successful, the financial pressure on the
police to conform more closely to judicial
standards would doubtless follow. Finally, if a
careful line is drawn between those situations
where increased personal liability should be
placed upon the individual policeman (basically
those involving serious and intentional violations
of law) and those where he should be immunized
and sole liability placed upon the governmental
agency, interference with the efficient function-
ing of law enforcement would be minimized." 2
CONCLUSION
The modernization of arrest privileges is needed
to make them consistent with the conditions under
which the police today must protect the public
from criminal attack. The following advantages
would be gained from liberalizing ancient rules of
arrest based on conditions that no longer exist
2 43 CALn. L. Rav. 565, 595 (1955).
and from penalizing a political subdivision for
abuse of authority by its police:
1) Public peace and security would be increased
by enhancing the likelihood of discovering persons
seeking an opportunity to attack.
2) The effectiveness of the administration of
justice would be increased by facilitating the
investigation of suspects, the arrest of criminals,
and the collection of admissible evidence. By these
means both clearance and conviction rates would
be increased.
3) The security of the police would be increased
by permitting them to discover weapons that may
be used to attack them and by making it illegal
to resist arrest by a known peace officer.
4) Higher standards of service and stricter
adherence to the legal restrictions imposed on the
police would result when a community or other
political subdivision was penalized for abuse of
authority by its police.
